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Consumers constantly enter into blind bargains online. We trade
our personal information for free websites and apps, without knowing
exactly what will be done with our data. There is nominally a notice and
choice regime in place via lengthy privacy policies. However, virtually
no one reads them. In this ill-informed environment, companies can
gather and exploit as much data as technologically possible, with very
few legal boundaries. The consequences for consumers are often far-
removed from their actions, or entirely invisible to them. Americans
deserve a rigorous notice and choice regime. Such a regime would allow
consumers to make informed decisions and regain some measure of
control over their personal information. This article explores the
problems with the current marketplace for our digital data, and it
explains how we could make a robust notice and choice regime work for
consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
When you go online or use an app on your phone, you are sharing
your information with multiple companies at once.1 For example if you
tell the dating website OkCupid that you occasionally drink or do illegal
drugs, not only will OkCupid save that information to your profile, but
marketers can also buy that information in real time.2 If you search for
something on the Center for Disease Control's website, say, "herpes
symptoms," then the CDC will tell Google about your search.' The CDC
is not trying to profit from you, but they use Google Analytics to
measure their website traffic. The CDC uses Google Analytics because
it is an effective free tool.4 It is a "free" tool because it is quietly paid for
with your data.5
There are programs that can show you which third parties are
watching you on a given website.6 They can even block many of these
third parties,' although blocking them may disrupt the appearance or
usability of some sites.8 But these programs cannot tell you what those
third parties will do with your information.9 They also cannot tell you
what inferences these companies might make about you.'0 For example,
1. Robert L. Mitchell, Ad Tracking: Is Anything Being Done?, COMPUTERWORLD
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2489106/data-privacy/ad-
tracking-is-anything-being-done-.html.
2. Daniel Zwerdling, Your Digital Trail: Private Company Access, NPR (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/10/01/227776072/your-digital-
trail-private-company-access.
3. Brian Merchant, Looking Up Symptoms Online? These Companies Are Tracking




6. See, e.g., GHOSTERY, https://www.ghostery.com/en/features.
7. See id But Ghostery itself may actually track you too, if you let it. Tom
Simonite, A Popular Ad Blocker Also Helps the Ad Industry, MIT TECH. REv. (June 17,
2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/516156/a-popular-ad-blocker-also-helps-
the-ad-industry/. Ghostery and similar programs can also be thwarted. See, e.g., Frans
Ros6n & Linus Sarud,. Chrome Extensions - AK4 Total Absence of Privacy, DETECTIFY
LABS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://labs.detectify.com/post/13352821838 1/chrome-extensions-
aka-total-absence-of-privacy.
8. See Andrew Couts, Privacy Plug-in Showdown: Do Not Track Plus vs.
Ghostery, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/do-not-
track-plus-vs-ghostery/.
9. See Privacy Badger FAQ, PRIVACY BADGER, https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
(last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
10. See id.
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in order to send them relevant coupons, Target famously created an
algorithm to determine which female customers might be pregnant.11
Women did not need to buy baby clothes for Target to know they were
pregnant-it was subtler cues like buying zinc, lotion, and a purse large
enough to double as a diaper bag.12 Target was aware that it could make
women "queasy" by suddenly sending them ads for maternity clothes, so
it instead started to insert baby-related ads among those for unrelated
products to make the placement look random.'3 "As long as we don't
spook her," a Target executive said, "it works."
14
Many Americans feel spooked.5 Our data seems to be more widely
disseminated and more vulnerable than ever. Hackers gained access to
millions of Americans' accounts at JP Morgan and Anthem Health
Insurance.16 The NSA collected millions of Americans' phone records
for years.'7 Commercial data brokers buy and sell our data to such an
extent that one broker has 3,000 data points for nearly every single U.S.
consumer.
1 8






15. Anne Flaherty, Associated Press, Americans Growing More Concerned Over
Their Online Privacy: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/online-privacy-study_n_3870670.html ("50
percent of Internet users saying they are worried about the information available about
them online, up from 33 percent in 2009.").
16. Supriya Kurane, JPMorgan Data Breach Entry Point Identifled: NYT, REUTERS
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity-
idUSKBNOK105R20141223; Elizabeth Weise, Millions of Anthem Customers Alerted to
Hack, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/02/05/
anthem-health-care-computer-security-breach/22917635/. ,
17. The USA Freedom Act mandated that the NSA's bulk collection end on
November 29, 2015. Ellen Nakashima, With Court Approval, NSA Resumes Bulk
Collection of Phone Data, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/with-court-approval-nsa-resumes-bulk-collection-of-phone-
dataI2015/06/30/a40c5a64-1 f3f- 1 e5-bf4l -c23f5d3facel _story.html. The NSA is not the
only agency that had been in the habit of collecting Americans' telephone records in
bulk. The DEA kept records of virtually all Americans' international calls to as many as
116 countries from 1992 to 2013 with no court supervision whatsoever. The program
stopped after the public backlash to the NSA's similar program. John Ribeiro, US Drug
Enforcement Amassed Bulk Phone Records for Decades, PCWORLD (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2907332/us-drug-enforcement-amassed-bulk-phone-
records-for-decades.html.
18. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
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At least 30 percent of Americans have taken one or more steps to
avoid surveillance since the Edward Snowden revelations.19  The
remaining 70 percent have not taken steps either because they are not
concerned, or simply do not know where to begin. The above
scenarios-cyber attacks, government surveillance, and commercial data
aggregation-are fundamentally different problems with different
solutions. But it is easy for the disparate threads to merge together to
become one amorphous fear, with no hint of how to secure our personal
information.
This article seeks to take on just one of those threads-commercial
use of individuals' data. Consumers enter into essentially blind bargains
online, where they trade their personal information for free websites and
apps. Despite the presence of a notice and choice regime, virtually no
consumers read the relevant privacy policies.2° Some consumers think
just having a privacy policy means a website will keep their information
private.2 In this environment, companies can gather and exploit as much
data as technologically possible, with very few legal boundaries. The
consequences for consumers are often invisible to them. Consumers
deserve a more rigorous form of notice and choice that allows them to
make informed decisions and regain some measure of control over their
personal information online.
Part I of this article will explore why the current system of buying
and selling individuals' digital data is problematic. Part II will describe
the various laws and agencies that are active in this area of privacy law.
Lastly, Part HI will propose a new, mandatory notice and choice regime
to empower individuals and to pressure companies to take greater
responsibility for what they do with their customers' data. Part IV will
briefly conclude.
I. WHAT'S WRONG WITH "CREEPY?"
Third party advertisers-"third" parties because they are present in
addition to both (1) you and (2) the website you are visiting-can often
foster "creepy" outcomes. Just three years ago it was considered
19. Jason Hahn, Pew: 22% of Americans Have Changed Email, Social Media, Cell
Phone Use Post-Snowden, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.digitaltrends:
com/web/pew-22-of-americans-have-changed-emai-scial-media-cell-phone-use-post-
snowden-nsa/. Other studies have previously shown the number of Americans who have
tried at least one method of hiding their online activity is as high as 86 percent. Flaherty,
supra note 15.
20. James Temple, Why Privacy Policies Don't Work - And What Might, SFGATE
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newsworthy to report that, if you searched for an item on Google,
Facebook would show you ads for that same item the next day.22 One
young journalist described this experience as "creepy.' '23  Today, the
experience is commonplace.24 Many users may still be creeped out, but
others are pleased to receive ads that are relevant to them.25
These relevant ads are made possible by the extensive profiles built
by data brokers. Data brokers collect vast amounts of information about
consumers, such as their race, sex, education level, politics, buying
habits, and social security numbers.26 Consumers are then classified
according to their age, socioeconomic status, political leanings, or even
religious affiliations.27 These classifications, while useful to advertisers
trying to reach specific consumers, can also shade into discrimination. A
data broker-created category containing high numbers of low-income
minorities might be targeted with high-interest payday loans.28 The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") posits that a category like "Biker
Enthusiasts" could be useful for advertisers wanting to sell motorcycles,
but the category could also be used by an insurance company looking for
signs of risky behavior.29
22. Walter Hickey, I Just Realized How Zealously Facebook Tracks Me And Sells
That Info To Advertisers, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.
com/i-didnt-know-facebook-tracked-me-2013-4.
23. Id.
24. See A.E.S., How Online Advertisers Read Your Mind, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21,
2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains
-12.
25. A 2012 Pew Poll found that 28 percent of Americans, particularly younger
Americans, did not mind targeted advertising because it provided them with more
relevant ads. Internet Users Don't Like Targeted Ads, Pew Research Center (Mar. 13,
2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/internet-users-dont-like-targeted-ads/.
26. See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-
giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html.
27. Companies Tracking Our Online Footsteps Should Be More Transparent, Says
FTC, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 13, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/companies-
tracking-online-footsteps-transparent-says-ftc/.
28. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Recommends Congress Require the
Data Broker Industry to be More Transparent and Give Consumers Greater Control Over
Their Personal Information (May 27, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker-industry-be-more
[hereinafter Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers]; Julie
Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Big Data and Consumer Trust: Progress and
Continuing Challenges, Remarks Before the International Conference of Data Protection
and Privacy Commissioners (Oct. 15, 2014), in FED. TRADE COMM'N COMMENT, 2014
WL 5319633, at *3.
29. Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers, supra note
28.
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Additionally, the data brokers' profiles usually contain mistakes.
One of the largest brokers admitted that "up to 30% of a person's
profile... may be wrong at any given time., 30 These mistakes, of which
consumers are almost inevitably unaware, can have real consequences.
One data broker named Spokeo paid $800,000 to settle FTC charges that
it marketed its profiles as an employment screening tool, when it had
failed to ensure that its profiles were accurate.31 It is not hard to imagine
a job applicant being passed over because a broker incorrectly reported
his education level, or managed to paint an unflattering picture through
various other inaccurate pieces of personal information.32
The profiles data brokers provide could readily facilitate illegal
discrimination. The brokers themselves, however, are essentially
unregulated and operate with what the FTC calls "a fundamental lack of
transparency.3 3 So while a job applicant who believes she encountered
a racist interviewer in.person can sue under anti-discrimination laws, that
same applicant will likely have no inkling that she was discriminated
against because of her (possibly incorrect) Spokeo profile.34 The data
brokers enable employers and others to discriminate, or at the very least
get uncomfortably close to ethical gray areas, by offering vast amounts
of personal information that were not previously readily available.
We are hardly the first generation to have struggled with the effects
of new, privacy-reducing technologies. Justice Louis Brandeis was
disturbed by the proliferation of gossip columns, and in particular, the
30. Melanie Hicken, Find Out What Big Data Knows About You (It May Be Very
Wrong), CNN MONEY (Sept. 5, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/pf/acxiom-
consumer-data/.
31. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC
Charges Company Allegedly Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in
Violation of FRCA (June 12, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedly-marketed
[hereinafter Press Release, Spokeo to Pay $800,000].
32. One plaintiff alleged that Spokeo hurt his employment prospects by incorrectly
listing "his employment status, marital status, age, educational background, number of
children, 'economic health,' and 'wealth level."' Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11,
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 11-56843), 2012 WL 2132528,
at *11. The Ninth Circuit did not decide if the prospective harm to Robins' employment
status was enough to support standing, because the court found that he had standing
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d 409, 413-14 (9th Cir.
2014). The Supreme Court granted cert and heard argument this past November. The
question presented was if Congress may confer Article III standing on a plaintiff "who
suffers no concrete harm." Spokeo v. Robins, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-v-robins/.
33. DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANsPARENcy AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
18, at vii.
34. Even if she were aware of her profile, she may not have standing or the ability
to show a harm to her employment prospects. See Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3.
[Vol. 120:3
ONLINE PRIVACY AND THE INVISIBLE MARKET
advances in "instantaneous photograph[y]" in 1890.35  He wrote an
article called "The Right to Privacy," which provided the background
principles for modem privacy law.36 His worries feel outdated now, but
at the time, the "unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons"
was a real concern because a new technology had enabled wide
circulation of portraits for the first time.37  One generation's
technological crisis is another generation's status quo. When Caller ID
was first introduced, some felt it created serious privacy problems.38
Some states even sought to regulate it.39 Today, Caller ID is ubiquitous
and an essential part of any cell phone's functionality.
40
One difference between photographs, Caller ID, and our current
situation is that photographs and Caller ID are visible to the consumer.
Many of the technologies that invade our privacy today do so invisibly.
Besides the data brokers and smaller third party trackers described in the
introduction, various apps and items we purchase directly can also
collect a surprising amount of personal information. You might not mind
your Groupon app knowing your location so it can offer you deals for
local businesses, but you might mind it checking your location every 20
41minutes and selling your location to advertisers. You might be happy
to buy a TV that can be voice-activated, but you might not realize that
this TV will record all your conversations and send those conversations
to third parties (albeit for apparently benign purposes).42 There is a
wealth of new data being recorded from users, including sensitive (but
35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193, 195 (1890).
36. See generally id.
37. See id.
38. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and
Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 72-73 (2014).
39. Id.
40. Many people may not answer their phone if they do not recognize the number
calling them. Moreover, try to imagine looking up a recent call, or finding an old voice
mail, without each item helpfully labeled with the correct name or number.
41. Dozens of popular apps collect your location every three minutes, sharing your
location information with advertisers 73 percent of the time. Mary Beth Quirk, Study:
Some Popular Android Apps Tracking User Location Once Every Three Minutes,
CONSUMERJST (Mar. 24, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/03/24/study-some-popular-
android-apps-tracking-user-location-once-every-three-minutes/.
42. Samsung apparently uses a third party company to help comprehend your voice
commands, but it does not say who that third party is, or if your voice data is encrypted or
otherwise protected when it is transferred. Parmy Olson, Samsung's Smart TVs Share
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unprotected) health data.4 However, the developing economy around
individuals' data is largely invisible to us.
That is not to say that we are not active participants in this
economy. Our data is purchased (for very small amounts, at the
individual level),44 and we are compensated for it. Services like Gmail,
Google Calendar, and Facebook are only free because users' data
empowers Google and Facebook to generate a lot of revenue from selling
ads.45 If they were barred from aggregating our data, they could no
longer offer targeted ads, potentially seriously hurting their bottom lines,
and their ability to offer services for free.46 We have, in a sense, simply
bargained our data away for free services.47 But it is a bargain we
accepted without any firm sense of what exactly we were giving up.
I do not wish to underplay the multifaceted value of many online
services. Ben Wittes and Jodie Liu wrote an excellent article arguing
that there are actually many privacy gains we receive from modem
technologies, which are often unfairly dismissed as merely gains in
48convenience or efficiency. Most people are grateful they can ask
Google about their embarrassing medical symptoms instead of asking a
43. Health apps have greatly increased in popularity, but the information collected
by them is not covered by HIPAA because the health information is generated by the
user, not by a HIPAA-covered entity such as a hospital. Andrea Peterson, Privacy
Advocates Warn of 'Nightmare' Scenario as Tech Giants Consider Fitness Tracking,
WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/05/19/privacy-advocates-wam-of-nightmare-scenario-as-tech-giants-
consider-fitness-tracking/.
44. Your location is only worth about $0.0005, though your health information can
go for $0.26. Emily Steel, Callum Locke, Emily Cadman, & Ben Freese, How Much is
Your Personal Data Worth?, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927
ca86e-d29b- 1e2-88ed-00144feab7de.html#axzz3XPy8lowp.
45. See Heather Kelly, Why Gmail and Other E-mail Services Aren't Really Free,
CNN (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/tech/web/gmail-privacy-
problems/; see also Rolfe Winkler & Jack Marshall, Google May Offer New Way to
Target Ads, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-may-offer-
new-way-to-target-ads-1429044389.
46. See After Success, More Spending on Mobile Local Ads, EMARKETER (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.emarketer.com/Article/After-Success-More-Spending-on-Mobile-
Local-Ads/1010763; see also Steven Perlberg, TargetedAds? TV Can Do That Now Too,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/argeted-ads-tv-can-do-that-
now-too-1416506504.
47. For an alternative perspective on the value of individuals' data, see JARON
LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FuTURE? (2013). Lanier advocates for individuals being
compensated for their data and other digital contributions via an attribution and micro-
payments system. Id. at 19-21.
48. Benjamin Wittes & Jodie C. Liu, The Privacy Paradox: The Privacy Benefits of
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friend or making a doctor's appointment. It is definitely a privacy gain
to keep your medical concerns or pornography preferences away from
people you know, even if the tradeoff is sharing that information with
Google. However, by using examples like health information and
pornography, Wittes and Liu primarily envision privacy as secrecy. But
when Americans are aware of any type of surveillance, they often react
negatively, whether it concerns their darkest secrets or their everyday
behavior. For example, Google Glass was a flop in large part because
people disliked the idea that they could be unknowingly filmed by
anyone wearing Google Glass.49 Even if the filming was in a public
place, such as a bar or restaurant, people were upset by it.5° People do
not want their everyday interactions recorded. Therefore, the privacy
gain of Google keeping our embarrassing secrets for us must be
measured against the privacy. loss of Google learning things that might
not be secret per se, but that we do not want recorded on a daily basis.
We are fairly adept at protecting our privacy in the physical world.
We know to lower our voices when having a private conversation in a
public place. We often change our behavior when someone points a
recording device at us, whether or not we were engaged in a "secret"
activity at the time. But when we go online, these physical cues are
absent. There is consequently an intuition gap between how private our
online browsing feels, and how public it actually is.51 We may know
intellectually that our activities are being recorded, but there is no
physical trigger that warns us to watch what we do or say. At the same
time, the consequences are arguably much greater. A stranger might
eavesdrop on you in a restaurant, but the stranger does not know who
you are and likely will not remember your conversation a day later.
When a data broker or Google tracks your behavior online, that
information is identified with you personally, and it will be saved for an
unknown (and possibly indefinite) period of time.5" If users could
49. Alyssa Newcomb, From 'Glassholes' to Privacy Issues: The Troubled Run of
the First Edition of Google Glass, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com
/Technology/glassholes-privacy-issues-troubled-run-edition-google-gass/story?id=
28269049.
50. See, e.g., Hillary Crosley Coker, Entitled Creep Secretly Films People With
Google Glass, JEZEBEL (Feb. 28, 2014), http://jezebel.com/entitled-creep-secretly-films-
people-with-google-glass- 1532859496.
51. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2012) (discussing how "visceral" notice could be a
boon to online privacy).
52. See Cecilia Kang, Google Tracks Consumers' Online Activities Across
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intuitively understand how they were being monitored, they might take a
much stronger approach to protecting their data.
Currently, it is not clear how strongly we should protect Americans'
privacy online. There are privacy policies that alert users, albeit in
opaque terms, that their data will be collected and shared. However,
virtually no one reads these policies.53 Americans provide inconsistent
opinions about privacy in survey results.54 One survey suggests that we
tend to accept whatever data sharing is the status quo, but resist
additional sharing, without any firm idea of what the status quo is.55 On
a more academic level, the federal Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board held a day-long public meeting in 2014 called "Defining
Privacy.,56 Over a dozen panelists highlighted the many different ways
people think about privacy.57 If privacy experts cannot agree on a single
definition of privacy, and if average Americans have inconsistent
opinions about what they are comfortable sharing, how can we craft a
coherent policy approach to address Americans' concerns about online
privacy?
One important first step we can take is to better inform individuals
about the invisible personal data marketplace. If users had access to
clear, concise information about what data was being collected about
them and what was being done with that data, the intuition gap between
the physical world and the online could be greatly reduced. Americans
might then speak with a more uniform voice about what practices they
53. If someone wanted to read all the privacy policies for the websites they visit in a
year, it would take them about one month. Shankar Vedantam, To Read All Those Web
Privacy Policies, Just Take A Month Off Work, NPR (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/04/19/150905465/to-read-all-those-
web-privacy-policies-just-take-a-month-off-work.
54. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 38, at 64 (discussing a study where
approximately half of the respondents did not want companies being able to hear them
complaining about the companies, unless the companies' goal was to improve their
products, in which case listening in was fine).
55. A survey by Carnegie Mellon Professor Lorrie Faith Cranor and Stanford
Professor Aleecia McDonald showed that "only 11 percent of Americans would... pay
$1 per month to withhold their data from their favorite news site .... [But] 69 percent of
Americans [would not] accept a $1 discount on their [monthly] Internet bills in exchange
for allowing their data to be tracked." Alexis C. Madrigal, How Much Is Your Data
Worth? Mmm, Somewhere Between Halfa Cent and $1,200, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/how-much-is-your-data-worth-
mmm-somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and- 1-200/254730/.
56. See November 12: Public Meeting on "Defining Privacy", PRIVACY & CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20141020.html.
57. See generally Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., Defining Privacy Forum
(Nov. 12, 2014) (transcript available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/20141112-
Transcript.pdf).
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are comfortable with. Dr. Lorrie Faith Cranor, a privacy expert at
Carnegie Mellon University (and currently the FTC's Chief
Technologist), conducted a study wherein consumers used a custom-built
search engine to find products to buy online. Next to the links to
websites selling the products, the search engine displayed a simple
"privacy meter" that indicated how strong the privacy policy was for
each website. A significant number of consumers chose to pay more for
the products when they could buy them from more privacy-protective
websites.58 Therefore, this study suggests that effective privacy notices
could make a real difference in changing consumers' behavior, and
consequently, the privacy practices of individual companies.
Different privacy notice regimes have been tried previously, with
mixed to mostly poor results. Part III will explore these previous
attempts before suggesting how a new regime could actually benefit
consumers. However, it is helpful to first examine what laws we
currently have in place that can protect Americans' privacy online.
Hl. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIVACY LAW
A. Federal Statutes and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures,59 including warrantless searches of our digital
data.6° While the Fourth Amendment has significant implications for the
interplay between government and the private companies that hold our
data,61 the Fourth Amendment does not protect us from our voluntary
interactions with private companies.
Congress has passed a number of sectoral statutes that protect
discrete types of data that may be held by corporations. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) protects our credit information.62 The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects students'
educational records.63  The Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects our medical information.64 These
58. Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for
Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 292-93 (2012).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,.2495 (2014).
61. See Rebecca Lipman, The Third Party Exception: Reshaping an Imperfect
Doctrinefor the Digital Age, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 471 (2014).
62. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1681-1681x (2012).
63. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
64. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.).
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statutes cover limited types of information, in limited situations. The
medical information your FitBit or Apple Watch collects is not covered
by HIPAA because HIPAA only covers certain entities like hospitals or
health insurance companies, not user-generated health information.65
New educational apps record how long students spend watching tutorials,
how they do on quizzes, and how long it takes them to do their
homework online.66 But none of this information, or the consequential
inferences educational companies can make about a child's intelligence
or interests, is protected by FERPA because the apps' data does not
constitute a protected "education record.,67  Congress will hopefully
close some of these holes, but statutory reform is painfully slow
compared to how quickly technology moves forward.
Our system is significantly different from Europe's approach. The
European Union ("EU") has pursued an omnibus approach, where data is
protected regardless of the type of entity holding the data or the exact
68type of data at issue. This more comprehensive view of a "right to
privacy" affects how companies view their obligations to their
customers. For its UK website, the giant data broker Acxiom has a
privacy policy page that begins with "Acxiom Ltd respects the right of
individuals to privacy. '69  The equivalent U.S. webpage begins with
"Acxiom respects the privacy of every individual about whom we either
process information or maintain information within Acxiom's
information products.,70  Besides being much more legalistic and
difficult to read, the U.S. version does not contemplate any individual
"right" to privacy, and it mirrors the U.S. sectoral approach by carefully
defining whose privacy it will respect. These differences in approach
can result in real impacts on consumers.71  However, the EU has
65. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(4)(iv) (2015). See also Peterson, supra note 43.
66. Stephanie Simon, Student Privacy Pledged; Critics Scoff, POLITICO (Oct. 7,
2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/student-privacy-tech-companies-I 11645
.html.
67. See 20 U.S.C. §1232g(a)(4).
68. Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1966, 1975 (2013).
69. UK Privacy Policy, ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com/about-acxiom/privacy/uk-
privacy-policy/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
70. US Products Privacy Policy, ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com/About-
Acxiom/Privacy/US-Products-Full-Privacy-Policy/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
71. For example, a European court held that individuals have a broad "right to be
forgotten" that they can utilize to force Google to take down certain negative (though
truthful) search results. No comparable right exists for Americans who are unhappy
about their Google results. See Alistair Barr & Sam Schechner, Google Advisory Group
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struggled to meaningfully engage consumers about online privacy.72 The
EU's recent attempt at creating a notice and choice regime will be
discussed below in Part III.
B. Agency Actions in Privacy Law
Despite our lack of omnibus privacy laws, the FTC and Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") have taken steps to regulate data
privacy more broadly. The FTC has shown a significant interest in
privacy through reports on facial recognition technology, privacy
disclosures in apps, and privacy issues in apps aimed at children.73 They
have also studied health apps, specifically looking at what data those
apps are sharing with other companies.74 In 2014, they released a long
report on data brokers, focusing on nine brokers in an attempt to shed
some light on the industry as a whole.75  The name of the report is
telling: "Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability.
76
The FTC can only call for transparency and accountability, they cannot
mandate it without supporting legislation. The press release for the
report highlights this fact by providing a long list of policies the FTC
"encourages" Congress to consider enacting.77
The FTC, however, has been making the most of the statutory
authority it does have to protect consumers' privacy. The FTC has
authority from § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices.,78 This allows them to pursue both
companies that are blatantly trying to scam people, and companies whose
practices fall into more of a gray area.79 For example, the FTC entered
72. See Nicole Kobie, Why the Cookies Law Wasn't Fully Baked - and How to
Avoid Being Tracked Online, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2015),
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/19/cookies-how-to-avoid-being-tracked-
online.
73. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 626 (2014).
74. Kate Kaye, FTC: Fitness Apps Can Help You Shed Calories - and Privacy,
ADVERT. AGE (May 7, 2014), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/ftc-signals-
focus-health-fitness-data-privacy/293080/.
75. Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers, supra note
28.
76. DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
18
77. Press Release, FTC Recommends Congress Regulate Data Brokers, supra note
28.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
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into a consent decree with the app Snapchat, which promised users they
could send messages that would disappear instantly after reading. It
turned out that there were relatively simple workarounds that allowed
people to secretly save messages, and the FTC got Snapchat to agree to
20 years of monitoring to make sure they do not deceive customers with
false promises in the future.80 The FTC was able to get a similar consent
decree from Facebook when it broke numerous promises it had made to
users in its privacy policies.81
While § 5's "unfair or deceptive" language is powerful, these
situations require the FTC to catch companies in a lie. A company could
simply be vague about its commitment to privacy, or have a very broad
privacy policy and count on nobody reading it, and § 5 would not apply.
For example, the company Groupon was relatively open about the fact
that it was going to widely share its users' data (including their location)
so the FTC could not take action against them for doing so.82
Conversely, the FTC was able to go after a popular flashlight app that
sold location data because that app actively deceived users by giving
them a fake option to opt out of such tracking.83 If users do not do their
homework on what information their apps are collecting about them, and
the app makers are not foolish enough to outright lie about what they are
doing, the FTC's ability to control how companies share our data is very
limited.
In addition to using § 5 to protect consumer privacy, the FTC has
also used its § 5 authority to address data security. It has forced multiple
companies into settlements where the companies "put consumers'
personal data at unreasonable risk."84 This is a relatively novel use of §
5, and the FTC has been challenged on their ability to mandate how
companies protect user data from hackers. When Wyndham Hotels and
Resorts suffered a data breach, the FTC brought an action against them,
80. Brett Molina, Snapchat Settles Privacy Complaint with FTC, USA TODAY (May
8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/05/08/snapchat-ftc/8853239/.
81. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It
Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www. ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20 11/1 1/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-
deceived-consumers-failing-keep.
82. David Magee, Groupon 's New Privacy Policy Goes Too Far. Selling Out Users,
International Business Times (July 11, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/groupons-new-
privacy-policy-goes-too-far-selling-out-users-297525.
83.. Cecilia Kang, Flashlight App Kept Users in the Dark About Sharing Location
Data: FTC, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/flashlight-app-kept-users-in-the-dark-about-sharing-location-data_
ftc/2013/12/05/lbe26fa6-5dc7- 1e3-beO7-006c776266ed_story.html.
84. See 2014 PRrVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 79.
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and Wyndham moved to dismiss it.8 5 Wyndham asserted that the FTC
lacked the authority to pursue unfairness claims in the context of data
security, and alternatively, even if they did have that authority, the FTC's
data security actions violated fair notice principles because the FTC had
not promulgated regulations saying what data security measures
companies had to take.6 The district court held in favor of the FTC, 7
Wyndham appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed, resulting in a major
win for the FTC.
88
Although the FCC has not been as active on the privacy front, they
have taken some steps to regulate data security. Recently, they entered a
$25 million settlement with AT&T after hundreds of thousands of
customers had their accounts breached.8 9 The FCC's statutory authority
is limited to telecommunication carriers under § 222 of the
Communications Act of 1934,90 giving them far fewer companies to
regulate than the FTC. Similar to the FTC, their authority in this area has
also been questioned-by two of the FCC's own commissioners.
Commissioner Pai has said that the FCC has never interpreted the Act to
create an enforceable duty for companies to reasonably protect their
users' personally identifiable information.91 Commissioner O'Rielly has
said that he is "not convinced" the FCC has the authority to act in this
area, even if companies generally have a responsibility to safeguard their
customers' data.92 Both commissioners also raised fair notice concerns
similar to those Wyndham raised against the FTC.93 Given the questions
surrounding the FTC's and FCC's authority to force companies to
85. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). See also
Paul Rosenzweig, The FTC Takes Charge - FTC v. Wyndham, LAWFARE (Aug. 26, 2015,
10:05 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ftc-takes-charge-ftc-v-wyndham.
89. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, AT&T To Pay $25M To Settle
Investigation Into Three Data Breaches (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.fcc.gov/document/att-
pay-25m-settle-investigation-three-data-breaches-0.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
91. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai, Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture, In re TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc. at 25, File No.:
EB-TCD-13-00009175, (FCC Oct. 24, 2014) https://apps.fcc.gov/ edocs_ public/attach
match/FCC-14-173Al.pdf.
92. Id. at 27 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael O'Rielly).
93. Id. at 25 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pai); id. at 27 (Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner O'Rielly).
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implement reasonable data security measures, it is unsurprising that there
have been strong calls on Capitol Hill for data breach legislation.94
In addition to § 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has authority to police
privacy under two other statutes that bear mentioning. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA") gives the FTC enforcement authority over
companies that provide consumer reports.95 The FTC has used this
authority to force settlements with companies like Spokeo and Instant
Checkmate,96 who do not advertise themselves as credit reporting
agencies,97 but do provide information that can amount to a credit
"consumer report.,98 The FTC can bring charges under the FCRA when
these companies fail to properly verify their information, fail to ensure
that their information will only be used for legally permissible purposes,
or fail to notify consumers about the information they are selling about
them.99 The FTC can also bring charges under the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act when companies collect children's personal
information without their parents' consent.m°
Lastly, the FTC has power beyond enforcement actions. The FTC
can issue guidelines, press releases, and the above-mentioned reports.10'
These documents create a kind of "soft law," as the FTC does not clearly
indicate what parts of its recommendations might be mandatory and what
parts could just be considered "best practices.'0 2 In particular, larger,
more responsible companies will tend to obey even soft signals from the
FTC to avoid the chance of facing an enforcement action.10 3
The FTC has taken the lead on privacy through these different
methods, but its ability to fully address digital privacy concerns is
limited. The FTC is responsible for policing both anticompetitive
behavior and unfair and deceptive practices in every industry.14 The
94. See Cory Bennett, Lawmakers See Momentum for Data Breach Legislation, THE
HILL (Jan. 27, 2015), http://the hill.com/policy/cybersecurity/230867-data-breach-bill-is-
achievable-goal.
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2012).
96. See Press Release, Spokeo to Pay $800,000, supra note 3 1; 2014 PRIVACY AND
DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 79, at 6.
97. See About Instant Checkmate, http://www.instantcheckmate.com/about/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2016); About Spokeo, http://www.spokeo.com/ about (last visited Feb.
28, 2016).
98. See 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 79, at 6; Press
Release, Spokeo to Pay $800,000, supra note 31.
99. Press Release, Spokeo to Pay $800,000, supra note 31; 2014 PRIVACY AND
DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 79.
100. 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE, supra note 79, at 7-8.
101. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 73, at 625.
102. Id. at 626.
103. See id.
104. About the FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
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agency may not have the bandwidth to also figure out how to extend
their existing authorities to cover the abundance of new privacy
problems. Moreover, the FTC's basic approach makes the most sense
when the agency is policing the relationship between consumers and the
companies with which they interact. When a third party aggregator
collects information about an individual from various sources, there is no
direct interaction where they could have "deceived" the consumer. It is
also difficult to argue that data brokers acted "unfairly" when their
business model is the established driver of online advertising. The FTC
cannot even mandate privacy policies-that was done by state law, in the
innovative state of California.
C. California's Privacy Laws
California has long been a leader in online privacy laws. Most
websites have privacy policies due to California's Business and
Professions Code § 22575, which requires that any website collecting
personally identifiable information must "conspicuously post" a privacy
policy on its website.1°5 The law applies to any website that people in
California might use, and therefore effectively requires privacy policies
nationwide.10 6 The law went into effect in 2004, and has since been
amended to require that websites disclose both how they respond to "Do
Not Track" signals, and if third party trackers may be present on the
company's website10 7 A bill was proposed in 2013 that have would
mandated that privacy policies be much simpler and shorter, but the bill
died a year later. 108
California further forces disclosure through its "Shine the Light"
law. Section 1798.83 of California's Civil Code requires companies to
disclose if they sold a consumer's personal information for direct
marketing, or alternatively, let a consumer opt out of the information
sharing.09 If the company chooses the disclosure route, it must disclose
105. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575(a) (2014). Other states have since passed
similar laws requiring privacy policies. See, e.g., Delaware Online Privacy and
Protection Act, S.B. 68, 148th Gen. Assemb., (Del. 2015).
106. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22575(a).
107. See A.B. 370, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Consumers:
internet privacy), searchable at LEGIS. COUNSEL'S DIG.,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml.
108. A.B. 242, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Privacy: Internet),
searchable at LEGIS. COUNSEL'S DIG., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearch
Client.xhtml.
109. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(a) (2006); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(e)(6)(A)
(2006); California' S.B. 27, "Shine the Light" Law, ELEc. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/sb27.html.
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both the companies with which it shared the individual's information,
and what information was shared." 0 The law is limited, however, in how
it defines "direct marketing purposes." Direct marketing only covers
solicitations made to consumers via phone, mail, or e-mail.' It does not
cover ads on websites and phones, or collection by data brokers.112
Furthermore, the disclosures are only available to consumers upon
request,13 and studies have shown that compliance with the law is
spotty.114 A "Right to Know" Act proposed in 2013 sought to expand §
1798.83, but it died in January 2014.11 The expansion would have
removed the "direct marketing" limitation, allowing consumers to find
out all the different companies to which their information was being
sold. 16 The proposed act, however, still would have required consumers
to file a request in order to find out exactly who the company was
sharing their personal information with. 117
California has also been the most aggressive in protecting children
online. Section 22581 of their Business and Professions Code requires
that websites and apps allow minors to take down content they
previously posted."8  If a teenager posts an inappropriate photo on
Facebook, and later realizes that it was a bad idea, the photo can be
permanently deleted-but the law does not force third parties to remove
content that has already been re-posted by someone else.'19 In another
area of children's privacy, California passed the Student Online Personal
Information Protection Act in 2014.120 The Act goes a long way towards
regulating educational apps that track students' development.121  It
prohibits targeted advertising, using students' data to build a profile
about them for non-educational purposes, and selling or disclosing
110. Id.
111. Cal. Civ. Code §'1798.83(e)(2).
112. See id.
113. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83(a).
114. Robert J. Herrington, Illuminating Calif 's 'Shine the Light' Law, LAW360,
http://www.law360.com/articles/299 095/illuminating-calif-s-shine-the-light-law.
115. A.B. 1291, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (Privacy: Right to




118. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22581(a)(1) (2014).
119. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22581(b)(2) (2014).
120. S.B. 1177, 2013-2014 Senate, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2014) (Privacy: students),
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students' information. 22 Similar bills have been discussed at the federal
level, but Congress has yet to follow California's lead.1
23
III. NOTICE AND CHOICE AS A SOLUTION
While all of the above laws and agency actions are helpful in
addressing certain privacy concerns, they do relatively little to address
the larger problem of individuals entering into blind bargains for their
data and subsequently feeling insecure about their privacy. Consumers
can be empowered by giving them effective, immediate notice of what a
given company will do with their information. However, before
exploring a new notice and choice regime, it is important to review the
regimes that have previously been attempted, and analyze why they
failed.
A. Previous Attempts at Notice and Choice Solutions
Europe has been concerned about data privacy for a long time. The
EU adopted the Data Protection Directive in 1995, which established
many rules for information privacy.124 A directive, however, is not a law
directly applicable to the various EU members. It is a mandate for the
different EU members to pass their own laws consistent with the
directive.125 This results in a patchwork of protections that can lead to
the original directive being watered down in practice. This watering
down effect is apparent in the EU's attempt to notify users when
websites collect their data via cookies. The EU passed additional privacy
directives in 2002 and 2009 to specifically regulate the use of 
cookies.12 6
The 2002 directive created an opt-out system for users to avoid cookies,
and the 2009 directive ostensibly strengthened privacy protections by
requiring users to opt-in before cookies could be placed on their
computers.127 This has resulted in many websites simply adding a small
banner on the top of their homepage that says something like: "We use
122. Id.
123. The federal Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act was introduced in
Congress at the end of April 2015. Natasha Singer, Legislators Introduce Student Digital
Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://bits. blogs.nytimes.com/2015/0
4 /2 9/
legislators-introduce-student-digital-privacy-bilL/.
124. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
125. Paul M. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 1971-72.
126. Eoin Carolan & M. Rosario Castillo-Mayen, Why More User Control Does Not
Mean More User Privacy: An Empirical (and Counter-Intuitive) Assessment of European
E-Privacy Laws, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 324, 336-38 (2015).
127. Id.
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cookies to give you the best possible experience on our site. By
continuing to use the site you agree to our use of cookies."' 128 This may
be followed by a link that says "find out more," which leads to an
extensive privacy policy.129 There is little reason to think this type of
notice is much more effective than American websites that include links
to their privacy policies at the top or bottom of their webpages.1
30
Moreover, different European countries have different requirements for
providing users with cookie notices,'13 leading to a complex web of
regulation for companies to navigate. At the same time, there has been
little enforcement against non-complying websites,132 leading to a much
weaker notice and choice regime than the privacy directives envisioned.
The most prominent previous attempt at a notice and choice regime
in the United States was P3P, the Platform for Privacy Preferences. P3P
was a standard created by the World Wide Web Consortium-the
organization that sets many of the standards for the internet.133 In the
mid-1990s, people had already noticed the unintelligibility of many
websites' privacy policies, and there was a movement to simplify and
128. TEsco, www.tesco.com, (last visited Dec. 30, 2015) (website for a leading
British grocery and general merchandise retailer).
129. Id.
130. One commenter notes that the cookie banners do not cause users to think about
what cookies are or why they are used, making them ineffective for enhancing users'
knowledge or privacy. Nicole Kobie, Why the Cookies Law Wasn't Fully Baked - and
How to Avoid Being Tracked Online, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2015),
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/19/cookies-how-to-avoid-being-tracked-
online (quoting Greg Rouchotas, technical director at Civic UK). A British web software
development firm created a humorous infographic explaining the ineffectiveness of the
UK's cookie laws, and celebrated their "death" in 2013. Oliver Emberton, The Stupid
Cookie Law is Dead at Last, SILKTLDE (Jan, 31, 2013), https://silktide.com/the-stupid-
cookie-law-is-dead-at-last/.
131. See generally BRISTOWS, STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE 5.3 OF DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC (THE "EU COOKIE LAW") (June 5, 2015),
http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-
%20NEWSLETTERS/IP%20ICT/2015/European-Cookie-Law-Implementation-Survey-
June-2015.pdf (explaining how companies can comply with each country's cookie laws).
The report notes that many countries have provided no official guidance on how to
comply with the laws. Id. at 63.
132. Saira Nayak, EU Regulatory Update: Dutch Cookie Rules Enforced, TRUSTE
BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.truste.com/blog/2014/08/05/eu-regulation-update-
dutch-cookie-rules-enforced/ (noting that Spain took the lead on cookie law enforcement
by fining two companies in 2013, and the Dutch had pursued two cases since then);
Jennifer Baker, French Privacy Cops Snarl at Websites Over Crap EU Cookie Warnings,
REGISTER (July 2, 2015),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/07/02/cnil tells 20 french_websites_stoptrackingu
sers/ (reporting that France warned but did not fine twenty non-complying websites).
133. ARI SCHWARTZ, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., LOOKING BACK AT P3P:
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 1 (2009), https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/P3PRetroFinal_0.pdf.
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standardize the policies.134 If the policies were standardized, they could
be easily read by both humans and machines. This standardization and
ease of comprehension would ideally lead to a person being able to set
their privacy preferences just once in their browser, and then whenever
the user visited a website that did not conform to their preferences, their
browser would either block the site, or the user would be notified and she
could choose to visit the site anyway.
135
P3P ran into many problems. The primary issue was that creating a
binding machine-readable P3P privacy policy was not mandatory.
136
When Microsoft incorporated P3P into Internet Explorer, companies had
to provide a P3P policy to get their cookies through to the user.
However, there was no enforcement mechanism forcing companies to
obey their own P3P policies (the FTC declined to get involved in
enforcement here), and, even more egregiously, it turned out the policy
could literally just say "Bogus Policy" and Internet Explorer would let
the cookies through, since "Bogus Policy" was not on the browser's list
of policies to block.137 P3P's ineffectiveness led many to criticize it as a
false attempt at self-regulation that merely served to put off actual
regulation by Congress. P3P was also criticized for being overly
complex,139 and it never gained a large amount of support from the
public.
"Do Not Track" is a more recent effort at protecting users' privacy
online, and it also has a notice element to it. All major browsers now
have an option where the user can ask the websites they visit not to track
them.1 40 The FTC announced support for the program back in 2010, but
even then the agency noted that it could not unilaterally mandate such a
system.141  As mentioned above in Part II, California passed a law
requiring websites to disclose how they respond to these "Do Not Track"
134. Id. at2.
135. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRETTY POOR PRIVACY: AN ASSESSMENT OF P3P AND
INTERNET PRIVACY (2000), https://epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html.
136. See id.
137. Lorrie Faith Cranor, Internet Explorer Privacy Protections Also Being
Circumvented by Google, Facebook, and Many More, TECHNOLOGY ACADEMICS
POLICY (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.techpolicy.com/Cranor
IntemetExplorerPrivacyProtectionsBeingCircumvented-by-Google.aspx.
138. See, e.g., ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRETTY POOR PRIVACY, supra note 135.
139. AR SCHWARTZ, LOOKING BACK AT P3P, supra note 133, at 8.
140. Thorin Klosowski, Everywhere You Can Enable "Do Not Track", LIFEHACKER
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://lifehacker.com/everywhere-you-can-enable-do-not-track-
1006138985.
141. Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online
Users, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/business/media/
02privacy.html.
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signals, so users can read websites' privacy policies to find out what
companies do when they receive individuals' requests.142 More likely
than not, the website does nothing. Major websites like Google and
Facebook ignore "Do Not Track" requests.1 43 They claim it is unclear
what the users really want (users probably want some cookies to be
placed, lest they have to sign in again every time they want to check their
Facebook newsfeed,) and it is not always clear that the browser is
expressing the user's true preference, since some browsers have "Do Not
Track" set as the default.144 While there have been some news stories
about companies not honoring "Do Not Track,"145 as with P3P, there has
been no wave of public outcry over the loss of a potentially valuable
privacy mechanism.
AdChoices is likely the least effective privacy-enhancing regime in
effect today. In 2010, the Digital Advertising Alliance introduced a
turquoise AdChoices triangle that could be placed in advertisements.
46
If users click the triangle, they are given the choice to opt out of
behavioral tracking by many third parties.147  Very few consumers,
however, know what the triangle signifies or choose to click on it.148 The
system is also flawed in that AdChoices works based on an "opt-out"
cookie which will be deleted if the user deletes their cookies at some
point, and even if they do not delete the cookie, they may still end up
being tracked. 149
142. See, e.g., CNN Privacy Statement, How We Respond to Do Not Track Signals,
CNN (July 31, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/privacy.
143. Elise Ackerman, Google and Facebook Ignore "Do Not Track" Requests,




145. See id.; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Yahoo Won't Honor 'Do Not Track' Requests From
Users, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/02/yahoo-wont-
honor-do-not-track-requests-from-users/.




148. Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61,
127 (2014); see also Alina Tugend, Key to Opting Out of Personalized Ads, Hidden in
Plain View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/
business/media/key-to-opting-out-of-personalized-ads-hidden-in-plain-view.html?_r=0.
149. Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient, supra note 58, at 300-01.
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B. Why Pursue A New Notice Regime?
The domestic regimes listed above share some common problems:
companies' participation was not mandatory, public pressure was
insufficient to force companies to participate, and the information
provided to consumers was often unclear.
This is unfortunate, as notice has multiple benefits as a regulatory
tool. First, if you can make your notice mechanism visible and easy to
understand, you can empower consumers to make informed choices. In
some cases, consumers may feel that they do not have much of a
choice-if you want to be on a social network with your friends, you
probably have to join Facebook. However, huge websites like Facebook
will be constrained to an extent by media coverage of their privacy
practices.15° Lower profile websites like news outlets or travel search
engines are relatively interchangeable, and therefore could be seriously
affected by a mandatory notice and choice regime. Second, notice
regimes discourage practices that are obviously objectionable from a
privacy standpoint, because companies do not want to tell customers they
engage in such practices. Even with the lengthy and opaque privacy
notices currently in place, the FTC is able to catch companies who
violate their own privacy policies.5' Companies write privacy policies
that restrict their own actions because they want to reassure their
customers that they do take some steps to protect their users' privacy.
Third, and most importantly, a notice regime can force companies
to take more responsibility for what happens to individuals' data.
California's law mandating privacy policies only requires that companies
tell users the categories of personally identifiable information they
collect, and the categories of companies with which they share that
information.1 52 The law does not tell consumers what happens to their
data once it is passed on to a third party. If a notice law mandated that
companies inform consumers what uses their data will be put toward,
then companies could be forced to vet the third parties with which they
150. Facebook has often been in the news because of its privacy practices, and often
changed course when the public responded negatively. See Bobbie Johnson & Afua
Hirsch, Facebook Backtracks After Online Privacy Protest, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/feb/19/facebook-personal-data; Reed
Albergotti, Facebook Changes Real-Name Policy After Uproar From Drag Queens,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-changes-real-name-
policy-after-uproar-from-drag-queens-1412223040.
151. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, FTC Delivers Mixed Warning on Location-
Tracking, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-delivers-mixed-
warning-on-location-tracking-1429820925; Press Release, Facebook Settles FTC
Charges, supra note 81.
152. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(1) (2014).
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share data. They would also need to make sure that the third parties were
only using their customers' data for the uses specified in the company's
privacy policy. Otherwise, the company would be subject to the same
sort of enforcement action that the FTC now conducts against companies
that break the promises in their privacy policies. Companies would in a
sense be "trustees" for their customers' data: 153 they would be free to put
people's personal information to a variety of commercial uses, as long as
they take responsibility for what happens to it. 154 Third parties, like data
brokers, would consequently be limited to selling individuals'
information for only specific permitted purposes, instead of the current
free-for-all.
In crafting the specifics of a notice and choice regime, it is
important to consider the research that has been done on how privacy
notices affect consumers. For example, if a website simply asks users
what information they would like to share, users feel empowered and
will actually share more information than in other scenarios where they
are not given explicit control over sharing their information.
1 55
Consumers tend to narrowly focus on the act of sharing their data with
one party, rather than thinking about who else might be able to access
their data or what their data might be used for later.5 6 This narrow focus
is another consequence of the intuition gap between the physical and
online worlds. In the physical world, if you tell a friend a sensitive piece
of information, the worst likely outcome is that your friend proves
untrustworthy, and shares your sensitive information with other mutual
153. For an interesting discussion of creating a trustee model to prevent "data abuse,"
see Benjamin Wittes & Wells C. Bennett, Databuse and a Trusteeship Model of
Consumer Protection in the Big Data Era, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2014/06/04-data-abuse-privacy-
wittes-bennett/wittes-and-bennett-databuse.pdf.
154. The 1995 Data Protection Directive ostensibly gives Europeans the right to
know who is receiving their data and what their data is being used for, however, the right
announced in the Directive has not led to the kind of robust enforcement that the FTC is
capable of. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 309-10 (2011) (comparing the FTC's
"entrepreneurial use of its enforcement power" with the relatively weak European
enforcement agencies, and noting the surprising lack of initiative shown by European
privacy advocacy organizations in utilizing the Directive's protections). See also
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 5, 6 (2010),
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/frauploads/815-Data-protection-en.pdf (noting
that in many EU countries, prosecutions for violations of the data protection laws are
limited or non-existent).
155. Carolan & Castillo-Mayen, supra note 126, at 326.
156. Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control
Paradox, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340 341-42 (2012).
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friends. Therefore, it makes sense to focus on the moment you share
your information with your friend-that is the one moment you can
control, and the privacy risks are obvious and tied to that moment.
Sharing your information online, however, contains hidden privacy risks,
which are tied to unknown individuals accessing your information later.
When you share sensitive information online, the worst outcome could
be that countless corporations you are unaware of later buy and sell your
information and possibly even discriminate against you because of it.
This is a far worse outcome than the average consumer is intuitively
aware of when sharing information online. A new notice and choice
regime must focus on closing this intuition gap, so that consumers will
be encouraged to exercise control over how other companies may access
and use their data in the future.
Instead of a notice and choice regime, some commentators might
advocate for outright prohibitions on certain practices, or prefer an opt-in
only regime for tracking.157 There are areas where we do not allow
consumers to make certain choices because the government makes a
policy judgment that the harm is just too great. For example, you cannot
buy very cheap but slightly rancid meat in a supermarket. The
government will not allow you to make that bargain. There are arguably
bargains that people should not be able to make with their data. A data
bargain may be egregiously bad (i.e. a cookie I can never delete in
exchange for reading a single news article), or we may wish to protect
the wide swaths of people who would ignore even an incredibly well-
designed notice regime to consistently make mediocre bargains for their
data.
I would personally like to see certain data practices outlawed. For
example, I do not think companies should be able to use purchasing data
to make medical assessments about their customers, such as Target using
algorithms to figure out which of their customers are pregnant.158 I also
do not think a website that deliberately solicits self-incriminating legal
information (such as OkCupid asking if you do illegal drugs)159 should
be able to share that information with any third parties. However, these
are my own personal policy preferences. I have no way of knowing if a
poor young pregnant woman who could really use some coupons for
baby clothes would mind terribly that Target analyzed her data to
determine she was pregnant. As noted in Part I, individuals are quite
157. Timothy J. Van Hal, Taming the Golden Goose: Private Companies, Consumer
Geolocation Data, and the Need for A Class Action Regime for Privacy Protection, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 734-35 (2013).
158. Duhigg, supra note 11.
159. Zwerdling, supra note 2.
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inconsistent in how they respond to surveys about privacy.160 Because
current data practices are so opaque to consumers, we have no way of
knowing what trade-offs they might be willing to make. Nearly costless
actions like turning on the "Do Not Track" signal or occasionally
deleting cookies do not tell us how consumers would react to options that
both actually stopped tracking and have real costs.
One final benefit to a notice and choice regime is that it can provide
companies and policy makers with data points on how much consumers
really value privacy. In Dr. Cranor's experiment where consumers could
see how protective online sellers were of their privacy before they
bought an item, individuals changed their behavior based on the privacy
notices.16 1  Rather than a lengthy privacy notice tucked away on a
website, her experiment gave users notice right in their search engine, in
an easy-to-comprehend privacy meter next to the seller's links.162 There
were four boxes, and if the boxes were all green, the site was very
protective of privacy.163 If they were all white, the site was not at all
protective of the user's privacy.164 An effective notice regime like that,
which successfully gives consumers an immediate sense of how a
website treats their data, produces useable data about how much more
consumers will pay for privacy. Once we acquire such data on a large
scale, we can intelligently craft policies where some uses of personal
information may be prohibited or strictly regulated.
C. The Outlines of a Mandatory Notice and Choice Regime
The Obama Administration has proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights that would give consumers notice about what information a
website or app collects about them, and what they do with that
information.165 However, this proposal has been attacked by privacy
advocates and the head of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection for
being full of loopholes and allowing companies to police themselves.
166
160. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 38, at 64.
161. Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient, supra note 58, at 292-93.
162. LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. CYLAB, UNDERSTANDING




165. ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
OF 2015, 6, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-
act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf.
166. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Consumer Protection Official Blasts White House Privacy
Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/03/09/federal-
consumer-protection-official-blasts-white-house-privacy-proposal/.
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To overcome the shortcomings of the previous notice regimes, a new
regime must be mandatory, strictly enforced by the FTC, and provide
clear information to consumers. The first step is for Congress to pass a
statute that requires all companies that collect consumer data via the
internet (be it a website, app, or part of the "internet of things"1 67) to
publish a privacy policy. Going beyond California's law, regulatory
authority must be given to the FTC to craft a uniform machine-readable
policy for all companies to use.168 Policies need to detail what data the
company collects, what the company uses individuals' personal
information for, and any third party uses of customers' data. Companies
that violate their own policies, intentionally or unintentionally (by
sharing data with an unreliable third party), must be subject to
enforcement actions. A negligence standard should be put in place
where if a company vetted a third party, contracted to share data with
them for a certain purpose, and the third party violated the agreement by
using the data for another purpose, then the FTC would have to pursue
that third party. However, if a company agreed to share data under a
vague contract, or with a fly-by-night third party who was obviously not
a legitimate business, the primary company would be on the hook for the
violation.
In designing a uniform privacy policy, simplicity is vital.
Consumers cannot be expected to spend time reading detailed policies.
They need an easy way to comprehend and compare policies. Dr. Cranor
has come up with an excellent model for privacy notices: nutrition
labels.169 A graphic is available in the previous footnote, but the format
is essentially a grid with "information we collect" along the vertical axis,
and "ways we use your information" along the horizontal axis. Each box
in the grid represents a particular type of data, and a particular use of that
167. More and more household appliances are connected to the internet for
convenient remote control, energy efficiency, and numerous other purposes. See In the
Privacy of Your Own Home, CONSUMER REPORTS (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2015/06/connected-devices-and-
privacy/index.htm. For any item that collects your data and transmits it outside your
home, the item's privacy policy could be published on its packaging, with emails sent to
the consumer if the policy changes at a later date.
168. There is a potential First Amendment issue here, but the government is at
minimum able to compel commercial speech when it is purely factual and
uncontroversial, and appropriate to prevent deception. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Privacy notices arguably
fall under "preventing deception," but the D.C. Circuit also has held that other substantial
interests besides combatting deception could also justify compelled commercial speech.
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014). I believe
protecting Americans' personally identifiable information is clearly a substantial
government interest.
169. CRANOR, UNDERSTANDING USERS, supra note 162, at 7.
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data, such as "contact information" for "marketing purposes."
Categories under "information we collect" include "demographic
information" and "health information." Categories under "ways we use
your information" include "provide service and maintain site" and
"profiling." The precise categories could be tweaked and designed to
provide more detailed information when the user hovers over or clicks on
each category. Each box may be red, to indicate that the company
collects and uses your information for a given purpose, or white to
indicate they do not.
After the "ways we use your information" categories, Dr. Cranor
has an additional section called "Information sharing" that I would title
"ways other companies can use your information." Such categories
could include specific uses such as "targeted advertising" and
"background checks." The categories should be worded in a way that is
not negatively slanted,170 but also makes clear exactly what may be done
with your data. The number of categories would need to be limited to
ensure that the grid does not become impossible to take in at a glance.
Even if the consumer does not read all of the category names, however,
they would still be able to get a general sense of the site's privacy policy
by immediately noticing if the grid is predominantly red or white. Since
every website and app would have the same grid, consumers would
become faster at reading the grid if they looked up different private
policies over time.
In most instances, consumers would not even need to view the
privacy grid. By having a mandatory machine-readable policy, the
system could work the way P3P was meant to: with the user inputting
their privacy preferences into their browsers one time, and their browsers
then looking at the policy for every site.1 71 With every website forced to
participate and fill out the same grid, there would not be the same
loopholes there were with P3P, where companies were able to provide
bogus policies. Users could simply fill in their own grids, and choose to
only visit sites that match their preferences. There is, however, a
question of what the browser should do when the user tries to visit a site
that does not match their privacy settings. The browser could be set to
either block the site entirely, or to provide a pop-up to warn users what
170. It would be a First Amendment problem to compel commercial speech that is
not "purely factual." See Zauderer 471 U.S. at 651.
171. For apps, users could set their preferences in their smart phones, and the phone
could read the privacy policy of any app they buy. For the "internet of things," consumers
would need to glance themselves at the privacy grid on the item's packaging, which
should be a lesser burden considering the relative infrequency of buying new appliances
vs. buying new apps or visiting new websites.
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aspect of their privacy settings the site does not adhere to and let them
click "OK" to visit the site anyway. For many webpages, the pop-up
could also offer the user one or two alternative webpages that are very
similar to the one the user was planning to visit. If I am searching for
some news item on Google, it is rare that I see a link and think "this is
the single article that covers the news story I was searching for." One
search result is often as good as another, and users may not mind going
to a different page with a single click.
There is also no reason users should have to set their own detailed
privacy preferences if they do not wish to do so. Browsers could offer
simple "low," "medium," and "high" privacy settings, or trusted
organizations like the ACLU could sponsor plug-ins that choose certain
settings for the user based on what data uses the ACLU believes are the
most harmful.
If consumers are dissatisfied with the number of pop-up warnings
they are getting, they could obviously choose a less-stringent privacy
setting, but they could also opt to receive notice at an earlier stage in the
process. Google could offer a plug-in that shows a website's privacy
rating right next to the search result, as in Dr. Cranor's custom search
engine. That way individuals could select a relatively privacy-friendly
result at the outset, rather than risk dealing with a pop-up.
IV. CONCLUSION
Americans should not have to settle for "creepy" or unfair privacy
practices. We should not have to feel perpetually uneasy about what our
personal information is being used for. The above notice and choice
regime significantly empowers consumers. If we force companies to
disclose precisely what they do, and what they enable third parties to do
with their customers' data, they will engage in more privacy-protective
practices to avoid "spooking" their customers. Journalists will report on
major companies whose grids are a sea of red. Consumers will change
companies' behavior by reacting to what the privacy grids reveal.
Exposure works: when Instagram announced it was changing its terms of
service in such a way that enabled it to sell users' photos, there was a
massive outcry and Instagram had to hastily reverse itself.172 Consumers
172. Craig Timberg, Instagram Outrage Reveals a Powerful But Unaware Web
Community, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/instagram-outrage-reveals-a-
powerful-but-unaware-web-community/
2 012/12/21/b387e828-4b7a- 11 e2-b709-
667035ff9029_story.html.
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have the power to change the way companies handle their data. They
just need to know about it first.
